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UNITED STATES AS A MONETARY UNION: 
A LESSON FOR EUROPE? 
Introduction 
Thirteen North American colonies gained independence from the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain in'1783, four years later the states agreed upon a constitution and 
set up a federation. Soon afterwards, with the election of the first president in 1789, 
the new nation established a well functioning central government However, the 
country had no single currency until 1879 and no central banlc "!ll1tiI1913. Nevert-
heless, in spi~e of the absence of institutions that are these days frequently perceived 
in the European Union (ED) as attributes of a powerful nation, the United States 
managed to settle vast new territories, develop new industries, as well as, wage and 
win wars. Consequently, at the time the Federal Reserve Banlc (Fed) was created, 
the nation was already a recognized economic and political superpow,er. America's. 
entry into the first world war tipped the scale in favor ofthe Entente and president. 
Wilson was in a position to play key role in the post-war peace conference. , 
Overall, the American experience shows that a political entity can play aglo-
bal role without a central banlc and a well established national currency. The factor 
that determines a country's importance is its political cohesion - the US ~njoyed 
a very well functioning democracy and a central government, especially the execu-
tive branch, a long time before the American dollar attained an important economic 
role all over the world. 
280 KAZIMIERZ DADAK 
On the other hand, Europeans seem to hold the opposite view, the founding of 
a central bank and the creation of a common cun-ency are seen as major steps in the 
process of political unification. Consequently, as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, on 
the one hand, the European Union has no representatiye government (the European 
Parlianient enjoys very· limited powers, especially regarding the executive branch-
the European Commission), but, on the other, the region has a single cun-ency issued 
by a central bank totally ind~pendent of any political, national or Europe-wide, en-
tity and a set of strict rules that govern fiscal policies. In sum, a "democracy deficit" 
coexists with rules and regulations that bind still sovereign nations, a development 
hardly conducive to building a cohesive, super-national political structure. 
Optimum Currency Area 
In hindsight we call. analyze the introduction of a single cun-ency and a central bank 
in the United States in the light of optimum currency area (OCA) theory, a concept 
developed only decades la~er (Mundell 1961, McKinnon 1963, and Kenen 1969). 
The theory postulates that regions can benefit from a common cun-ency, if they 
trade. a great deal among· themselves, there exists a very high· degree of mobility of 
factors of production among them, and there is a mechanism that allows for mone-
tary transfers aimed at softening asymmetric, i.e. region or industry specific, shocks 
(frequently referred to as "fiscal federalism"). " 
As of late 19th century, the United States met the above criteria reasonably 
well. Trade within the country by far exoeeded the nation's foreign economic re-
lations and there was a high degree of competition in factor markets. At the time 
labor was relatively homogenous and very mobile, and product markets were not 
overly monopolized (fither. The only missing factor was fiscal federalism, but also 
no other nation at the time used fiscal policy to transfer resources from booming 
, parts of the country to regions suffering from recessions. In other words, the Ame-
rican monetary union created no handicap in this respect. 
The introduction of a common currency required practically no change to 
the overall working of the economy, too, because at the time the entire developed 
world was on the gold standard. In othe~ words, most of the world was on a fixed 
exc~ange rate system and ad.opting a single cun"ency (akin to fi'{ing exchange rates 
among the different currencies circulating within the United States) made little dif-
t 
ference. Additionally, the gold standard allowed no room for discretioniry mone-
tary policy, i.e. the adoption of a common currency meant no loss ofra mechanism 
useful in addressing economic shocks. 
Overall, American monetary unification and the establishment of the Fed re-
sulted in a small change in the overall economic environment and the events caused" 
little, if any, loss of efficiency. On "the other hand, American monetary unification 
resulted in the elimination of any risk related to businesses operating with more 
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than one currency; i.e. most likely, presented a small gain. Moreover, the creation of 
the Federal Reserve System, which had a clear mandate to perform the function oflen-
der of last result, made the whole American banking system potentially more s~able. 
It is also worth noting that the American monetary unification coincided with 
the "first wave of globalization" (Baldwin and Martni 1999), a period characterized 
with international capital flows that (in relative terms) dwarfed even those of the 
present time (Crafts 2000). Therefore, by joining the gold standard the US Wlls able 
to attract foreign capital, a resource that the nation lacked very much. Consequently, 
it is not surprising that economists who analyzed monetary history of the United 
. States (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Meltzer 2003) noted no significant change in 
American economic perfonnance following the introduction of a common currency. 
Unlike in Europe before and after 1999, the monetary union required no significant 
adjustment in either economic policy or in the functioning of individual markets 
(labor and product). 
However, between late 19th and late 20th centuries economic reality, eco-
nomic theory, and economic policies changed enormously. First, the structure of 
American economy ch~ged from a relatively simple system based on agriculture, 
mining, and commodity-type products into a highly sophisticated organism based 
on diverse services and high-tech indus~es. Consequently, particular regions are 
specialized and labor force is characterized with more diverse skills and knowledge, 
developments that make labor mobility more difficult. On top of that, factor mar-
kets attained a higher level of monopolization and, as a result, their prices became 
more rigid. Not surprisingly, Tootell (1990) found that today the US no more ~a­
tisfies . crityria for an optimum currency area and, therefore, certain regions suffer 
prolonged periods of high unemployment resulting from asymmetrie shocks. . 
Secondly, following the collapse of the gold standard a huge change has 
taken place in domestic and international monetary arrangements. The demise of 
a lin1e between the stock of gold held by the central bank and the amount of money' 
in circulation signaled the beginning of discretionary monetary policy and its use 
to rectify economic problems. The downfall of the gold standard also spelled out 
the end of a fixed exchange rate system and the possible exploitation of currency 
depreciation in handling trade imbalances and in tackling the underutilization of 
economic resources. In sum, the general economic environment hasl changed dra-
matically; on one hand, ~actor markets that used to be very competitive and flexible 
developed into quite rigid ones and, on the other, monetary policy and exchange 
rates that used to be rigid b~came flexible and perceived as important tools of eco-
nomic policy. 
The following two sections provide a review of the use of both monetary and 
fiscal policies in the US wit~ an eye towards the working of the American monetarf 
union. 
282 KAZIMIERZ DADAK 
Role of monetary policy in the US economy 
Since the early 1980s, in the US, monetary policy has been used to' address, short-
te;rrn economic shocks, while fiscal policy has been employed to accomplish l"mg-
ternl'goals, for instance to stimulate economic growth (Meyer 2000). However, in 
a monetary union, the central ban1e has difficulties in addressing regiot;l.al (or indu-
strY ~pecific) shocks without possibly creating adverse conditions in other regions 
(industries). In particular, expansionary monetary policy aimed at stimulating gro-
wth in a depressed region may very well create excessive demand in regions en-
joying robust growth and, thus, contribute to inflationary pressures. Therefore, the 
, central monetary authority may frequently face trade offs, for instance, between 
price stability and economic growth or between the value of domestic currency and 
employment. Because the Fed is accountable for its actions, the bank needs guidan-
ce from the control1in~ entity (Congress) in resolvillg these dilemmas. 
Most recently, the Congress defined goals of monetary policy when it ad~ 
opted the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (commonly known as the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Act) in 1978. The law set three objectives for the Fed: affor-
dable long-term interest rates, full employment, and price stability. Because the 
first aim is a medium for attaining the s'econd, it is commonly assumed that the 
central bank has "twin goals" of price stability and full employment. 
It is important to stress that, although the Humphrey-Hawkins Act contained 
specific numerical targets, the Congress realized that the goals were overly am-
bitious and did not penalize the Fed for not meeting them within the prescribed 
time. Give!! this fiasco, the Congress has refrained from micromanaging economic 
policy and has never specified inflation and employment targets since. Similarly, 
th~ Fed'has also avoided'setting specific aims for itself; however, it has had internal 
'working definitions of price stability. It is widely assumed that the ballie currently 
de~es price stability as the rate of core inflation of about 2 percent. l In sum, on one 
hand, the American central ban1e has a great deal oflatitude in conducting monetary 
policy and, on the other, the Congress continuously monitors economic conditions 
~nd exerts pressure on the Fed through semi-annual hearings. 
The Fed is required by law to present the legislative power with written re-
ports prior to the hearings held separately by the two chambers. Additionally, Fed 
executives, including the Chairman, may be summoned to testify before,.each of 
the chambers of Congress at any time. These meetings serve not only the purpose 
of assessing the work of the ban1e, but also of getting the bank's input into new le-
gislation. Similarly, top executives of the Fed regularly meet with highest officials 
at the Department of Treasury. These sessions allow for exchange of opinions and 
, ,I Core inflation is defined as the overall consumer price levelless prices of food and energy. Prices of 
these items tend to be volatile and by eliminating them from the consumer price index the Fed is able to focus 
on long-term trends in price movements. ' 
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analyses, rather than offer the executive branch an opportunity to ex{)rt pressure on 
the central ballie. It is very important to stress that the hearings and required repor-
ting'make the Fed fully accountable for its actions. However, the bank is respon-
sible to the general public and the legislative power, not the executive; therefore, . 
there is little danger of the president using monetary policy for short-term political 
ends, for instance to stimulate the economy before elections. This threat is very 
much stressed by Nordhaus (1975); however, most economists (for instatree, Mc-
Callum, 1978,Alesina, 1989) dismiss this hypothesis. 
From the above, it is clear that the American central bank enjoys econo-
mic but not political independence. According to Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabel-
lini (1991) the former denotes freedom to choose specific tools of monetary poli-
cy (Debelle and Fisher (1994) cal~ this instrument independence) that are used in 
accomplishing specific targets (goals in the Debelle and Fisher taxonomy) set by 
another body, in this case, the US Congress. This is consistent with practice in most 
other developed nations and Debelle and Fisher conclude that this arrangement is 
most efficient. . 
Milton Friedman (1968) postulated. adhering to a rule in conducting moneta-
ry policy, i.e. increasing money supply by a fixed amount consistent with the long-
term rate of economic growth and the natural rate of unemployment, commonly 
. known as Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment - NAIRD. This great 
economist argued that discretionary monetary policy is ineffective, because, on one 
hand, given rational expectations, the central ballie is unable to increase the rate of 
economic growth (in the long-run, an excessive increase in money supply results 
olliy in a higher price level with no increase in the level of real activity - the so-
called neutrality of money), and, on the other, monetary policy may not be effective 
in stimulating a sluggish economy because of an unknown lag between a policy 
change and the impact of a new level of money supply on the economy. ill other 
words, a monetary stimulus may take effect only when the economic problem is 
already gone, and, thus, would only contribute to inflation. In spite of his view that 
olliy money matters, Friedman did not advocate· discretionary monetary policy. 
However, actions of the Federal Reserve Bank over the last quarter of 
a c~ntury clearly show that discretionary monetary policy is effective in combating 
demand-side shocks. During the tenure of Alan Greenspan as the F6d's Chairman, 
the bank frequently changed the target level of short-term interest rates in order to 
preempt adverse effects of economic disturbances. / 
Moreover, as Greenspan (2904) himself stresses, the very significant perma-
nent decrease In NAIRU, from about 6 percent to about 5 percent, that tookplace in 
the latter half of the 1990s was possible only because ofa very substantial moneta-
ry expansion (Graph 1). Not surprisingly, Benj~ririnFriedman (2006) summarized 
the Greenspan years at the Fed's helm as a triumph of discretion over rule. 
- ----------
. ------.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Unfortunately, over the same period, the Eurozone failed to record a siinilar 
success in bringing unemployment down in spite of a very significant decline in 
inflation and, consequently, a large decrease in long-term interest rates (Graphs 1 
and 2). 
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Inflation targeting in the US 
At this juncture it is important to add that, most likely, successes in keeping the 
US economy out of long periods of recession and in lowering NAIRU would not 
have been possible with the Fed attempting to attain a single goal, that of keeping 
inflation low. Blinder (2004) makes thls point crystal clear stating: 
It would take a great deal to convince me that U.S. monetary policy since 1979 - that's 
twenty-four years, under two Fed chairmen - would have bee-\1 better, if only we had I instituted' 
inflation targeting back then and stuck with it thick and thin. (p. 32) 
Moreover, the author is convinced that 
[t]he starkly different legal mandates of the European Central Banle (BCB) and the Fed 
have [ ... J allowed Greenspan to gamble on growth in a way that the more cautious ECB (and the 
. I 
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Bundesbank before that} was'unwilling to do. This is one, though not the only, reason the United 
States outperformed Europe in the 1990s (p. 31). 
Another important issue is the fact that the Fed showed a' good deal offiexi-
bility in targeting inflation. As I mentioned earlier, the Fed has never set a specific 
goal for an acceptable increase in the consumer price index. This strategy allowed 
the bank plenty of freedom in addressing this very important issue. 
, First of all, the Fed has never found itself in a position that it would have 
to sacrifice employment to prevent inflation exceeding a stated target, especially 
when commodity prices started to rise ~fter 2000. Second, even more important, 
the Fed has never fallen into the trap of attaining zero inflation. 
Following the 1970s, a period of stagflation, many economists emphasized 
the negative impact of inflation on the economy. Indeed, there are important effi-
ciency losses resulting from a high level of price increases (Bernholz 2003) and, 
the expepences ofthatperiorl reinforced the belief widely held above all in Germa-
ny that price stability is the most important goal of monetary policy (Stern 1999). 
However, ,this is by no means an established, economic truth. For instance, Barro 
(1997) showed that inflation hinders economic growth only at high levels, those 
exceeding 15 percent per year. His study is based on an analysis of 117 countries 
and, given the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964, Samuelson 1964), may be 
less applicable to mature economIes. Nevertheless, many central banks in develo-
ped countries aim at a rate of ~nfiation within: the range of 1-3 percent (Collins and, 
Siklos 2004). On the other hand, the ECB established a very ambitious target of no 
mo~e than 2 percent average price increase, and B1anchar~ (2003) and Lamy and 
Pisani-Ferry (2002) argue that the bank should increase its target for illflation. 
There are strong arguments in favor of the higher (1-3 percent) level of price 
changes. For instance, a low level of inflation is helpful in speeding up adjustments 
in real wages, a process necessary in restoring competitiveness of particular indu-
stries or entire nations, following an asymmetric shock. In a world with no price 
increases~ real wages decline only when n,ominal wages go down - a task very dif-
ficult to accomplish, because employees resist decreases in nominal ~ages, a fact 
commonly referred to as nominal wage downward rigidity. Bowever, with some 
price rises it is sufficient to keep nominal wages fixed for real wages to decline. 
Akerloff, Dickens, and Perry (1996) estimate that inflation of just 2 percent per 
year practically eliminates the problem of downward nominal wage rigidity, 
, Additionally, some inflation also helps in lowering real minimum wage, if 
the nominal minimum wage is held constant. Because inflation has been higher 
in the United States than in Europe, the minimum wage in the US declined much 
faster than in the ED and Gordon (2004) believes that this drop is a major cause for 
the unemployment rate in America being much lower than in the,EU. 
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There is yet another very important issue that the Fed has had in mind while 
targeting inflation - zero-bound interest rates. After the very'bad'experiences with 
inflation in the 1970s, the 1990s brought again to central bankers' attention the que-
stion of deflation. Beginning with the early 1990s, Japan has gone through a period 
of declining prices and extremely slow economic growth. When prices keep going 
down, even if the central bank lowers nominal interest rates to zero, real interest 
rates remain positive and, because of that, monetary policy may lose 'its power to, 
stimulate the economy. 
Ahearne et al (2002) agree that Japan's experience shows thatstimulating 
the economy is more difficult and more uncertain once deflation'sets in. These days 
deflation is perceived as a greater threat to economic prosperity than inflation (for 
instance, Kumar, et al. 2003, Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland 2004). For this rea-
son, many central bankers believe that having a positive rate of price rises provides 
them with a margin for error. In case the economy slows down and there 'emerges 
a threat of deflationary spiral, the ban1e can drastically lower interest rates to keep 
the real interest rate close to zero, or even make it negative. The Fed adopted this 
type of monetary policy following the stock market crash of2000 and, by doing so, 
most likely, prevented the American economy from slipping into a deep recession. 
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The question remains, what is the "safe" level of inflation, i.e. a speed of 
price increases that would give the central bank a large enough cushion to avoid 
a positive real interest rate, even when the nominal interest rate is set at nil. To 
address this issue it is worth mentioning that reported price increases overestimate 
actual inflation, because of problems with measuring price changes. First of all, we 
fail to account properly for the impact of quality improvements on price increases 
(Kokoski 1993), and, second, consumers tend to substitute cheaper prodm:ts for 
more expensive ones (Aizcorbe and Jacknian 1993). For the above reasons, it is wi-
dely believed that in the US repqrted price changes overestimate inflation by about 
1 percent per year (Moulton 1993). In other words, this is the absolute minimum of 
price changes and on top of t~at should come the cushion against the zero-bound 
interest rates. For instance 0rPhanides and Wieland (1998) estimate that the danger 
of monetary policy ineffectiveness goes away when inflation reaches 2 percent per 
annum. All the above do indeed support the view that for a mature economy to the 
like of the US or the Eurozone, inflation in the range of 1-3 percent is optimal. 
. Also economic reality points in this direction, because economic growth in 
the Eurozone failed to respond to a very significant, post-Maastricht decrease in 
inflation. The average rate of growth in the Eurozone was substantially below that 
experienced in the re~ion during the decade leading to the Maastricht Treaty and 
that recorded in the US over the same period. This was the case, both, during the 
time of convergence (1993-1998) and after the introduction of the single currency 
on January 1, 1999. (See Graph 2, where GDP deflator is used as a measure of 
inflation.)· . 
Effectiveness of American monetary policy 
Overall, economic reality shows that, over the last 25 years, the American mone-
tary policy has performed well in keeping the ~conomy out of trouble. During this 
period America has managed to reverse the economic convergence process that had 
been present over the previous quarter of a century. Until the late 1970s the stan-
dard of living (after adjusting for the difference in price levels, i.e. at the purchasing 
. power parity) of the future Eurozone had been quickly catching up w'ith that of the 
US; however, beginning with the early 1980s the gap has begun to increase again. 
(See Graph 3, where the term Eurozone indicates the original eleven EMU mem-
bers plus Greece). . 
Moreover, long-term projections indicate a fUrther decline in relative eco-
nomic power of the two largest economic blocks. OEeD (2005) predicts that by . 
2020 the gap between the average GDP per capita in the Eurozone and the US will 
increase to 37.5% and that the disparity will grow further by 10% over the follo-
wing decade. 
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This. accomplishment was possibie thanks to,. among other factors, the use . 
of monetary policy in combating demand-side shocks. The Fed and the controlling 
institution (Congress) as well as the executive branch worked well together' and 
managed to keep the American economy growing at a robust rate and to attain a low . 
levei of unemployment. Monetary policy has been geared towards attaining these 
goals, as well as, towards maintaining low inflation. In the US neither full employ-
ment nor price stability enjoys primacy --:- these two goals are seen complimentary. 
Monetary policy is aimed towards price stability and the minimization of efficiency 
losses resulting from price increases, but, at the same time, is' flexible enough to 
amortiz.e demand-side shocks and to foster real wage r;::tte adjustments and, thus, 
support continuous growth in income and employment. 
Fiscal federalism 
In the US, fiscal policy is also designed to support the monetary union. The federal 
government collects most taxes and federal taxes are used to finance numerous 
programs, but Washington also makes transfers to state- and local governments .. 
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As a result, if a region is going through a recession and its income goes down, the 
amount of taxes it sends to Washington declines, but the amount of transfers from 
the f~deral government does not change. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) estimate 
that this "auto~natic" decrease in contributions to the central government combined 
with no loss of federal aid may absorb up to 40 percent of an adverse asymmetric 
shock. In case of a very severe regional recession (or a natural disastyr), the federal 
government may directly aid the affected area further decreasing the pain. Another 
issue is federal help to underdeveloped regions. Such progquns oper~te at a much 
greater scale than similar assistance in the EU. 
Another important feature of American monetary union is absence of any 
restrictions on the level of budget deficit or debt level. For iJ.;lstance, in 1986 the 
state of Louisiana had a budget deficit equal to 5 percent of its revenue and the 
shortfall grew to 18 percent in 1988. However, this development caused no con-
cern in Washington, because the federal government has" no responsibility for local 
government debts. Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996) analyzed the question of re-
strictions on the conduct of fiscal policy on sub-national levels among nations with 
a federal political structure and concluded that restriction on deficit and debt levels . 
are usually imposed when the local government has no power to tax. In such a situ-
ation, the federal government collects all taxes and is also responsible for debts of 
local governments; therefore, it should be able to set limits on local governments' 
borrowing. In the US taxes are also collected at the state level and there is no reaspn 
to impose federal limits on states' ability to issue debt.2 
The very fact that the states face no artificiaL restriction on their ability to 
acquire debt does not mean that there is no incentive for state governments to keep . 
their books balanced. However, it is the mar1~et that enforces fiscal discipline, not 
the bureaucrats. Goldstein and Woglom (1992) show that the yield on bonds is-
sued by entities that tolerate high deficits or have high debt levels are higher than 
on securities sold by local governments showing a more conservative approach to 
spending. In other words, the market in)poses a higher interest rate on less. fiscally 
conservative governments. 
It is important to stress that the United States exhibit a great deal of national 
'cohesion and, consequently, transfers from rich to less fortunate regions' face less 
opposition than in other countries. Overall, federal taxation and transfers alleviate 
the effects of asymme~c shocks and provide assistance to less developed regions. 
2 It is WOlth noting that with one exception all American states adopted amendments requiring the state 
government to maintain balanced budgets. Nevertheless, the wording of those amendments inmost cases allows 
the state government to circumvent the restriction and states frequently run budget deficits. 
29Q KAZIMIERZ DADAK 
Lessons for the European Union? 
As stated above, present day United States does not meet criteria for an optimum 
currency area. Numerous studies show that the European Union is even less sui-
ted for such an arrangement (for instance, Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993, Artis, 
Kohler, and M6litz 1998). The main reasons for this surprising conclusion is an 
insufficient level of openness, susceptibility to asymmetric shocks (i.e. insufficient 
economic convergence), low mobility oflabor, and a lack of fiscal federalism. Un-
fortunately, in the case of the EU, none ofihe above problems can be easily over-
come. 
First, there is no plan or desire to increase taxation at the EU level, because 
fiscal federalism implies continuous transfers of purchasing power from wealthy 
nations to less advanced regions. Europe does not exhibit sufficient unity and be-
cause of that persistent transfers fi'om one nation to another are not an option that 
is easily acceptable for political reasons. For instance, in Italy persistent transfers 
from the North to the South are tearing the nation apart. It is even more difficult to 
envision handing over additional resources from the affluent North to, for instance, 
Romania. Allother avenue of adjustment, labor mobility, is limited not only becau-
se oflinguistic and cultural differences, but also because of, for instance, rigid real 
estate markets. 
Different levels of development ~ak~ the whole of the European Union pro-
ne to asymmetric shocks. These kinds of shocks would go away with fast economic 
convergence. (If ,all regions were similar, then an external negative shock would 
disturb the entire area to the same extent and an identical remedy would also ap-
ply to all regions.) The prospects for full convergence are not certain, however. 
De Grauwe' (2000) makes a splendid case for convergence, but Krugman's (1991, 
1993) arguments that integration leads to regional specialization are also very per-
suasive. If the latter view prevails, then the prospects for the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) are not very good, because the alternative mechanisms needed to 
alleviate the pain caused by asymmetric shocks are fiscal federalism and labor mo-
bility (see above). 
The use of monetary policy in addressing economic shocks is also q~estio­
nable. Maastricht Treaty clearly placed price stability at the top of the European 
Central1;3ank's priorities and the bank has been very finn in its commivnent to 
fighting inflation. On numerous occasions the ECB stated th?-t keeping prices stab-
le is the greatest contribution the bank could make to assure full employment and 
robust economic growth, and, as a result, inflation in the EU has been below that 
in the US. Nevertheless, a lower rate of price increases and, consequently, a lower 
interest rate that many members of the EMU now enjoy has failed to translate into 
a 1110re vigorous economy and a lower unemployment rate (Graphs 1 and 2). As 
a result, Europe has been losing ground in her race for economic hegemony with 
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the United States (Graph 3). UnfOliunately, there is little prospect for a change in 
the attitude of the ECB, because the banIe is totally independent of any national 
or Europe-wide power. A change in its status would require an amendment to the 
Maastricht Treaty, a procedure that would need approval of all Member States. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Maastricht Treaty did not obiige the ECB 
to play the role of lender of last resort. Therefore, the entire European financial 
system is deficient in this respect. Although the ECe very much increased4ending 
to European banIcs during'the recent liquidity crisis resulting from problems with 
mortgage-backed securities, yet, it is unclear whether or not the ECE would actual-
ly use its resources to bail out the banking system, if a full-blown crisis erupts. 
Conclusions 
The United States adopted a single currency and joined the gold standard, i.e. fi-' 
xed the dollar's exchange rate and gave up control over monetary policy when such 
a change necessitated little economic adjustment. At the time factor markets were 
highly competitive and the adjustment process occurred through changes in prices 
and wages. On the other hand, the European Monetary Union was adopted at a time 
when rigid factor markets made variable exchange rates and discretionary moneta-
ry policy attractive tools in healing economic imbalances and absorbing economic 
shocks. If European factor markets do not regain a high degree of flexibility and 
the EU does not introduce fiscai federalism, then the monetary union will result in 
a significant loss of efficiency, which will inevitably lead to slow economic growth 
and persistently high unemployment rates. Unfortunately, the experience of the 
entire post-Maastricht period, especially the last 9 years, does not point to a quick 
reversal ofthe adverse effects ofthe EMU on European economic performance. So 
far, the Eurozone has been recording,very sluggish growth and high unemployment' 
levels. Moreover, several nations have been exceeding defiCit and debt levels and 
the ECB has been unable to keep inflation within the stated target. Continuation of 
these trends will certainly put enormous pressure on the EMU and may lead to its 
collapse. 
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